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IMPOSTORS AND FICTITIOUS PAYEES
By Professor James J. White
I.

Basic Liabilities

A.
Section 3-40 5 codifies and adds to sec�ion 9(3) of
the Uniform Negotiable Instruments law.
It provides for a
series of cases in which an indorsement "in the name of a
named payee'' is effective even though that indorsemen t is
made by some person other than the named payee. But for the
application of 3-405, such an indorsement would be a forgery,
would prevent subsequent takers from being holders or holders
in due course and would cause each subsequent transferee to
breach his warranty of good title.
The consequence of 3-40S's
application is that the indorsement is good, subsequent parties
have "good title, " and so can enforce the instrument against
the drawer notwithstanding th e forgery.
Section 3-405 reads
in full as follows:
§ 3-405.

Impostors; Signature in Name of Payee

An indorsement by any person in the name of
(l)
a named payee is effective if

(a)

an impostor by use of the mails or other
wise has induced the maker or drawer to
issue the instrument to him or his confed
erate in the name of the payee; or

(b) a person signing as or on behalf of a
maker or drawer intends the payee to have
no interest in the instrument� or
(c)

an agent or employee of the maker or
drawer has supplied him with the name
of the payee intending the latter to have
no such interest.

(2)
Nothing in this section shall affect the
criminal or civil liability of the person so indorsing.

B.
Subsection l (a) deals with the standard case in �ich
one person poses as another.
A recent application of subsection
a. occurred when a crooked insurance agent posed as the insured
and caused the insurance company to issue checks to him in the
insured's name.
·
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c.
Subsection l (b) deals with the case in which the
drawer or a person with actual authority in the drawer's organi'
zation to draw, makes a check to one whom he intends to have no;
interest in the instrument.
An example would be the case of a
corporate treasurer who chose to draw a check to a fictitious
payee and then to cash it.

D. Subsection l (c) adds the prior law and is the
It covers the
frequently invoked subsection in 3-405.
padded payroll or padded accounts payable situation in which
the payroll clerk adds the name to the payroll, snatches the
check on the way back through the payment process and cashes
it.
E.

The recent cases and the issues that they present.

l.
Agency or not? According to the cases and the
comments, subsection l (a) does not encompass the case
in which a party represents himself to be the agent of
some third party and causes the check to be issued in the
name of that third party.
Comment 2 to 3-405 puts it as
follows:
"Impostor 11 refers to impersonation and does
not extend to a false representation that
the party is the authorized agent of the
payee.
A maker or drawer who takes the pre
caution of making the instrument payable
to the principal is entitled to have his
indorsement.

Iii .
j,
I
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For example, in Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland v.
Chemical Bank New York T rust Co., 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 508
(N. Y. Civ. Ct. 1970) an accountant posing as the agent
of two parties caused stock to be sold by a stock brokerag
The broker then sent his check in the name of the putative
principals to the thief who forged their indorsements and (
cashed them.
The court held that section 3-405 did not
apply since the accountant had simply misrepresented his
agency and had not posed as the named payees.
Compare
Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Manufacturers
Hanover T rust Co. , 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 1142 (N. Y. Civ. Ct.
1970) � in the Manu£actu�ers case Loretta owned a savings
account in a Savings and Loan Association. Either her
former husband Wolfgang or her former husband's new wife
appeared, presented a forged withdrawal order to the
Savings and Loan Association and so caused a check to be
Either Wolfgang or his new
drawn to Loretta's order.
wife then forged Loretta 's indorsement on the chec�.

81

i.0

Led

The drawer Savings and Loan argued that at least if Wolf
gang was the one who had presented the withdrawal orders,
there was no imposture, but only a misrepresentation of
agency for Loretta to withdraw the money and thus that 3-40 5
The court conclude d that Wolfgang did
would not apply.
not simply misrepresent his agency but that he in fact
used the wi thdrawal orders to "pretend to be Loretta."
The case seems questionable, most diffi cult to distinguish
from the Chemical Bank case.
See also East Gadsden v.
First City National Bank of Gadsden, 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 2 7 5,
281 So. 2d 431 (Ala. Ct. of App. 19 73)
•

2.

The existence of a real person or a real debt.

Under the pre-Code law it was sometimes argued that
if the named payee was not wholly f ictitious, but was in
fact the name of a real person, the doctrine did not
apply.
The secti on rejects that argument and states
in Comment 1 that "the exi stence or non-existence of
the named payee is not dec isive. "
e

s
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One cannot say the same for the existence or non
existence of a legitimate cla im under the l(c) cases.
In New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. First Pennsylvania Bank
and Trust Co. v. Neufeld , 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 1169 (3d Cir.
1971) a crooked stockbroker periodically sold stocks from
the accounts of his customers, caused checks made payable
to their order to be drawn and then stole the checks and
forged the indorsements.
The drawee bank argued that
3-405(1) (c) applied on the theory that the stockbroker
·had supplied the drawer with the names of the payees and
with the intent that they had no interest in the ultimate
checks.
The court accepted that argument.
It rejected
the argument that the customers were bona fide creditors
and distinguished the Snug Harbor case discussed below on
the ground that in Snug Harbor the payees were actual
credi tors.
In Snug Harbor Realty Co. v. F irst National
Bank of Toms R iver, N. J. , 2 53 A.2d 54 5, 6 UCC Rep. Serv.
6 89 (N. J. 1969) one Magee initialed valid invoices and for
The bookkeeper
warded them to Snug Harbor's bookkeeper.
verified the contractual obligations and prepared the
checks.
Magee stole the checks.
The New Jersey court
there rejected 3-405's application on the ground that
"the payees were bona fide creditors of the company who
had respectively submitted the ir invoices for work per
formed or materials furnished. 11
One retionale for the distinction between the two
cases is that in Snua Harbor reasonably appropriate account-

•I
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ing, auditing and bookkeeping measures still might not
have prevented the fraud, for a careful check would have
disclosed that the accounts were in fact owed. In the
broker's case an audit or cross check made at the time
the checks were drawn would have disclosed that the cus
tomers had not ordered the securities sales and were not
entitled to the money. It is not clear how one arrives at
the Snug Harbor conclusion under the language of 3-405(1)
(c)
Perhaps he can say in that case the agent did not
11supply 11 the name, rather that the name was in fact sup-·
plied by the creditor himself.
•

·

supplied? Both Snug Harbor and Neufeld also
3.
present the question when has the employee "supplied
the name of the payee intending the latter to
have no such interest"?
Comment 4 to 3-405 points out
that:
•

•

•

The provision applies only to the agent
or employee of the drawer, and only to the
agent or employee who supplies him with the
name of the payee.

.

.

The section is not meant to cover the messenger who simply
steals the check and forges an indorsement. Is there some
line that distinguishes those who do supply names (payroll
clerks) and those who do not (messenger) ? In the Neufeld
case the third cir cuit responded to that question with
respect to the stockbroker who submitted fictitious sell
orders as follows:
For the purpose of giving meaning to the word
" supplied 11 in Section 3-405 (1) (c) , we can find
no reasonable place to draw the line within the
business enterprise of the drawer. Accordingly,
in the context of the facts here, the only
rational distinction lies between the bona fide
and fraudulent transactions because it is only
in the case of a bona fide transaction that any
one other than the faithless employee can be
said to have supplied the name of the payee to
the company. When Wexler, by submitting the
fraudulent sell order to the t rading room at
Smith, initiated normal business practice to
produce a check payable to a named payee, and
Wexler intended the payee to have no interest
in the proceeds of the chec.1<, he 11supplied11
Smith with the name of the payee thereby making
his forged indorsement effective as between Smith
and the drawee Bank.
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II.

Defenses and Miscellaneous Issues

A. Neg ligence.
Since 3-40 5 is truly but a presumption of
negligence on the part of the·drawer, one can argue by analogy
to 3-406 and 4-406 that if the depositary or drawee bank are
themselves negligent, their negl igence s�ould bar them from
use of 3-40 5; the si gnature should be regarded as ineffective,
That would be the outcome under a routine appli 
as a forgery.
cation of the negl igence pri nciples of 3-406 where the customer ' s
negligence does not operate against the bank if the bank itself
fails to use "reasonable commercial standards. " In Prudential
Insurance Co. of America v. Marine National Exchange Bank of
Milwaukee, 14 UCC Rep. Serv. 462 (E. D. Wis. 1974) Prudential
A Prudent ial
issued a $20,000 check payable to a policyho lder.
employee had suppl ied the pol i cy owner ' s name intending that
she have no interest in the instrument.
W i l l iamson, the
Prudential agent, forged the payee's name on the check and so
transferred it to his bookie, Mr. Plotkin.
The bank ultimately
paid the $20, 000 check to the bookie.
The bank then argued
that the indorsement was effective because of 3-40 5 (1) (c).
Prudential responded that the cashing of a $20,000 check for
a bookie under such circumstances was not the observance of
reasonable commercial standards and thus that the bank should
be denied the use of 3-40 5 and be required to recredit its
account.
In rejecting Prudenti al's argument the court pointed
out first that Prudential was not arguing bad fai th or that
the depositary bank was not a holder in due course.
It
observed that 3-40 5 "flatly states that
the loss should
fall upon the employer of an unfaithful employee; no qual ifi 
cations for the negl igence of the payer bank is indica ted. 11
•

.,

�.

•

•

In an analogous case on slightly d ifferent grounds the
Tennessee Supreme Court came to a different conclusion,
Mcconnico v. Third National Bank of Nashville, 499 S. W. 2d
874, 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 6 41 (Tenn. 1973) . In that case Mr.
Hardison devised a variety of ways to get money out of his
corporation and i nto his own hands.
Ult imately the trustee
in bankruptcy of the corporation challenged some of these
transfers.
One such transfer was a corporate check payable
to the order of the "Clear Creek Coal Co. 11 drawn by Hardison.
Hardison forged the indorsement of the coal company and
deposited the check in his own account.
The bank's tel ler's
manual specif ied that checks payable to corporations could not
be cashed and had to be deposi ted to the account of the payee.
The court found that the defendant bank received notice from
the face of the instrument that t.."le transactions "were highly
irregular. ,.
The court held that such notice prec luded the bank
from becoming a holder in due course and found them to be liable
on the check despite 3-405.
The court fails to note that sec
tion 3-40 5 does no t speak of holders in due course and says
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s imply that indorsements which comply w ith 3-405 are 11effecti ve. ".
Presumably such indorsements would be as effective for non
holders in due course as for holders in due course. Therefore
it is unclear why noti ce and non-holder-in-due-course status
produce a contrary result in the Tennessee case unless that
court is really conclud ing that one who is negligent is not
entitled to the protection of 3-405.
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B. Note that if the forger i s not careful to sign the
exact name of the fictitious payee , section 3-405 may not apply.
See Travco Corp. v. C itizens Federal Savings & Loan Assn. of
Port Huron , 42 Mich. App. 291 , 201 N. W. 2d 675 , 11 UCC Rep.
Serv. 779 (M ich. Ct. of App. 1972).
That literal reading of
the indorsement rules i l lustrates the same thing as the
Ten.�essee case , namely, courts w i l l grasp for a way to deprive
the depositary or payer banks of the protection of 3-405 in
c ircumstances in which the courts regard the banks as negl igent.
C. Dual forgery.
In Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v.
Hampton State Bank , 497 S.W. 2d 80 , 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 876
(Tex. Ct. of Civ. App. 1973) , a thief forged the signature of
Mr. F.J. Spillman, president of Pizza Inn, Inc. and made the
check payable to a fictitious organization "P izza Inn, Inc.
No. 32." The thief then opened an account at Hampton State
Bank in the name of Pizza Inn, Inc� No. 32 , deposi ted the
$4 , 000 check and ultimately withdrew most of that sum.
Northwest National Bank made final payment on the check.
Subsequently Hampton asked Northwest to return the chec�
and made a claim aaainst its bonding company.
The appel late
court hel d that the bonding company did not owe Hampton any
thing because the under lying transaction had not caused
Hampton any loss "through forgery. "
The court found that
the indorsement was effecti ve because the thief signed "as
or on behalf of" the drawer (3-405). Thus the warranty of
good title was not breached and the loss should have rested
on the payer under the doctrine of Price v. Neal.
(Note
the court might have reached the same conclusion by conclud
ing , under 3-401 (2), that the indorsement was effect ive under
an assumed name selected by the thief.)

